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I. INTRODUCTION 
Spacious skies, amber waves of grain, and purple mountain majesties1—these 
words recall iconic images of the environment that American citizens know and 
love.  But the environmental justice movement views the environment in a much 
more simple way—it defines the environment by the various everyday places where 
Americans “live, work and play.”2  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
describes that the goal of the environmental justice movement is to obtain “the fair 
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, 
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”3  The environmental 
justice movement implicates principles from traditional environmentalism—such as 
preservation and conservation of natural resources—but applies them with respect to 
people.  Specifically, environmental justice is concerned with preserving the quality 
of life in communities that face disproportionately high levels of pollution from the 
disparate enforcement of environmental laws.4   
                                                          
 
1
 KATHARINE LEE BATES, AMERICA THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER POEMS 3 (1911). 
 
2
 PATRICK NOVOTNY, WHERE WE LIVE, WORK AND PLAY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
MOVEMENT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (2000).  
 
3
 Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/environmental 
justice/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2010).  The EPA defines fair treatment to mean that “no group of 
people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences 
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies.”  Basic 
Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmental 
justice/basics/index.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  The EPA defines meaningful 
involvement to mean: 
1. [P]eople have an opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may 
affect their environment and/or health; 
2. the public’s contribution can influence the regulatory agency’s decision;  
3. their concerns will be considered in the decision making process; and 
4. the decision makers seek out and facilitate the involvement of those potentially 
affected.  
Id.  
 
4
 It is important to reiterate that environmental justice issues do not arise as the result of 
illegal acts, or violations of environmental laws or policies, but simply from the inequitable 
enforcement of environmental laws.  Furthermore, environmental injustice does not always 
arise from malicious or intentional discriminatory decisions and can simply be the result of a 
lack of foresight.  For example, one of the most horrendous environmental disasters and 
examples of environmental injustice in Love Canal, New York gained national attention in the 
late 1970s.  Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA JOURNAL, January 1979, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.htm.  Commonly referred to as 
the “Love Canal tragedy,” residents in this small town in upstate New York were victims of 
severe toxic waste poisoning when the city built houses and a school on land that had 
previously been a hazardous waste dump.  Id.  The previous owners of the dump had covered 
up the waste with dirt and sold the land for one dollar, but the true costs were much more 
crippling.  Leeching chemicals and toxic wastes from the dump caused many birth defects, 
and the quality of life plummeted.  Id.  One reporter explained that, “[p]uddles of noxious 
substances were . . . in their yards, some were in their basements, others yet were on the 
school grounds.  Everywhere the air had a faint, choking smell.  Children returned from play 
with burns on their hands and faces.”  Id.  Subsequent environmental regulations—such as the 
 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss1/8
2011] THE CINCINNATI ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDINANCE 225 
 
The environmental justice movement’s focus on the human impact of 
environmental regulations requires more than merely writing and enforcing a 
uniform and static policy like those found in purely environmental regulations.  
Continually gathering data, providing opportunities for public participation, and 
providing the means to ensure equitable enforcement of environmental laws is the 
basis for effective environmental justice regulations.5  While the purpose and goals 
of the environmental justice movement borrow heavily from the areas of 
environmental and civil rights law,6 neither field encourages continual governmental 
responsiveness nor relies on dynamic regulation procedures to achieve its goals.  The 
success of the environmental justice movement, however, depends on having 
dynamic regulatory framework and government that will respond to results of new 
data and the desires of the public.  Currently, there are no formal policies or 
regulations in place to achieve environmental justice.  Therefore, environmental 
justice plaintiffs rarely succeed in obtaining recovery for their injuries. In the 
absence of any formal environmental justice regulations in the United States, this 
Note proposes a new model statute, to be implemented at the state level, that uses 
data collection and public participation to achieve environmental justice, equitable 
enforcement of environmental laws, and the fair distribution of pollution. 
Over the years, little has been done to provide legal remedies for victims of 
environmental injustice.  Although the EPA has recognized environmental justice as 
a nation-wide problem, its attention to the movement consistently falls short of any 
formal or legally enforceable regulations.7   Similarly, state and local environmental 
justice strategies do not have the force of law, and do little to regulate, enforce, or 
ensure environmental justice.  In 2009, however, the City of Cincinnati passed an 
                                                          
Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act—seek to prevent future environmental tragedies like Love Canal.  Id.  But 
environmental regulations do not address problems that have already occurred, nor do they 
consider the forward-looking issues of discrimination and equitable enforcement.  For 
example, in the 1990s, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) 
granted a permit for a cement manufacturing company under the Clean Air Act.  S. Camden 
Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450-51 (D.N.J. 2001).  
The community had already been burdened by two Superfund sites and fifteen contaminated 
hazardous waste sites, yet the proposed facility would have emitted various pollutants—
including mercury, lead, and carbon monoxide—into the air.  Id. at 450.  The NJDEP granted 
this permit in spite of the “pre-existing poor health of the residents” and “the cumulative 
environmental burden already borne by this impoverished community.”  Id. at 451.  Therefore, 
even legal permitting decisions can result in the inequitable distribution of pollution. 
 
5
 See infra Part III.A. 
 
6
 Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental 
Justice’s Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).  To a 
certain extent, civil rights and environmental law overlap, making it a sound basis for 
environmental justice policies.  Id.  However, environmental regulations are premised on the 
idea of enhancing the majority’s preferences for environmental reform, whereas civil rights 
laws are premised on the idea of protecting underrepresented populations from majoritarian 
pressures.  Id. at 4.  Where these two premises diverge, conflicts in how to regulate 
environmental justice occur.  Id. at 3.  Therefore, the environmental justice movement must be 
viewed independently from the environmental and civil rights movements in order to achieve 
its own unique goals.    
 
7
 See infra Part II.A.3. 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
226 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:223 
 
Environmental Justice Ordinance (“the Ordinance”),8 the first of its kind in the 
country to create regulation and enforcement measures specifically to achieve 
environmental justice.9  The Ordinance, written in response to air pollution problems 
in the City of Cincinnati, utilizes data collection and public participation procedures 
to prevent further degradation of the environment across the city.  Additionally, the 
Ordinance addresses one of the major shortcomings of other environmental justice 
regulations by increasing the local government’s accountability for its permit 
decisions, and therefore serves as a model for future environmental justice 
regulations.10   
The majority of environmental justice policies today exist as extremely 
decentralized municipal ordinances or as extremely centralized government agency 
strategies.  Each system of regulation presents distinct advantages.11  Therefore, an 
analysis of the Ordinance within the context of the ongoing debate between the 
benefits of centralized versus decentralized environmental regulations (the 
centralization-decentralization debate)12 examines the advantages of each scheme of 
regulations more extensively.  However, each argument in favor of one type of 
regulation represents a disadvantage of the other, so this Note argues that by 
implementing environmental justice regulations at the state level, with the Cincinnati 
Ordinance as a model, the benefits of both local and national policies can be 
combined while mitigating the relative disadvantages.  
To illustrate the inadequacies of both federal and local level attempts to achieve 
environmental justice, Part II of this Note canvasses a brief history of the 
environmental justice movement at the federal, state, and local levels, including a 
description of the specific provisions of the Ordinance.  As the history of the 
movement will show, neither the federal, state, nor local level governments provide 
effective or efficient legal remedies for environmental justice.  However, state 
administrative agencies, whose regulatory authority mirrors those at the federal 
level, have the flexibility to expand their environmental justice policies with the 
cooperation of state legislatures.  Part III of this Note then provides an analysis of 
the Ordinance regarding the effectiveness of its provisions in achieving the goals of 
the environmental justice movement.  The Ordinance provides an effective model for 
future environmental justice policies because it enhances government accountability.  
Additionally, Part III analyzes the Ordinance with respect to the centralization-
decentralization debate. Theoretically, environmental justice regulations can be 
promulgated at any level of government—either by the national government as the 
supreme law of the land or under the state and local police powers.  However, an 
analysis of the Ordinance within the context of the centralization-decentralization 
debate is necessary to show that practical considerations weigh in favor of neither 
                                                          
 
8
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
9
 David C. Crowley, Vice Mayor Crowley on Environmental Justice Ordinance, THE 
CINCINNATI BEACON, June 30, 2009, available at http://www.cincinnatibeacon.com/ 
index.php?/contents/comments/vice_mayor_crowley_on_environmental_justice_ordinance/. 
 
10
 See infra Part III.A. 
 
11
 See infra Part III.B.3.   
 
12
 See infra Part III.B.  
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local nor national environmental just policies, but for regulations at the state level 
instead. 
II.  A HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
During the environmental movement in the 1970s, evidence indicated that poor 
and minority urban populations suffered more from environmental hazards, yet the 
environmental movement focused primarily on preservation, conservation, and 
environmental aesthetics rather than public health or the potential impact of pollution 
on overburdened communities.13  Therefore, environmental justice advocates, 
seeking to remedy the pollution disparities suffered by low-income and minority 
communities, searched for legal remedies outside of the environmental movement.  
Due to the minority-majority demographics of many communities facing 
environmental hazards and being overburdened with pollution, grassroots organizers 
turned towards strategies from the Civil Rights movement.14  Unfortunately, neither 
environmental nor civil rights laws have provided adequate remedies for 
environmental justice claims, and all levels of government agencies have been 
reluctant to adopt mandatory environmental justice regulations.  The Ordinance, 
however, provides mandatory environmental justice regulations specifically written 
to achieve the movement’s goals. 
A.  Environmental Justice at the Federal Level 
1.  Legislating Environmental Justice 
The environmental justice movement derives its goals from both the 
environmental and civil rights movements.  Both those movements achieved great 
successes when federal statutes provided plaintiffs with causes of action. 
Accordingly, in the early 1990s, two legislative efforts aimed to address 
environmental justice by regulating the distribution of new facilities in order to 
prevent individual communities from suffering from disproportionately high 
pollution levels.15    In 1992, Representative John Lewis and Senator Al Gore 
introduced the “Environmental Justice Act of 1992.”16  This statute sought “to help 
those people who face the greatest risk of exposure to toxic substances and 
pollution”17 by identifying “environmental high impact areas.”18  It also imposed a 
                                                          
 
13
 OUR BACKYARD: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 6 (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diana 
M. Whitelaw eds., 2003).  
 
14
 Id. at 7.  Principles from the Civil Rights movement were invoked in the famous Warren 
County protests, a series of non-violent protests in opposition to the North Carolina 
governor’s decision to dispose hazardous soil in a predominantly African American 
community.  Id.   
 
15
 Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based 
Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 352-53 (1995). 
 
16
 Environmental Justice Act of 1992, H.R. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992); Environmental 
Justice Act of 1992, S. 2806, 102d Cong. (1992).  See Mank, supra note 15, at 353 (providing 
background information on the proposed environmental justice legislation). 
 
17
 138 CONG. REC. S7 489 (1992) (statement of Sen. Gore); Claire L. Hasler, Comment, 
The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: “I Have a (Green) Dream,” 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 417, 417 (1994). 
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moratorium on siting or permitting any new facility in a high impact area.19  
However, the legislation died in committee hearings.20  Just the next year, another 
congressional environmental justice statute met the same fate.21   
Since these two legislative attempts, Congress has not proposed any other 
environmental justice statutes.  Therefore, environmental justice plaintiffs must seek 
remedies under already existing civil rights and environmental laws. 
2.  Suing for Environmental Justice 
Without statutes specifically written to provide environmental justice remedies, 
plaintiffs are restricted to pursuing environmental justice under civil rights and 
environmental laws.  Although environmental justice incorporated principles from 
both bodies of law, neither area of law specifically addresses the goals of 
environmental justice, and the courts have imposed strict standards that often bar 
recovery on environmental justice claims.  
Due to the disproportionate rate at which low-income and minority communities 
are burdened with environmental hazards, environmental justice plaintiffs may 
pursue claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22  
Typically, these claims allege the government discriminated against racial minorities 
in its decision to site polluting facilities in a low-income or minority neighborhood.23  
However, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause must prove that the discriminatory intent motivated the 
governmental action.24  Under this standard, it is insufficient to simply prove that the 
government’s actions had a discriminatory effect.25  
                                                          
 
18
 Mank, supra note 15, at 353.  
 
19
 Id.  
 
20
 Hasler, supra note 17, at 445.  
 
21
 Id.  The Environmental Justice Act of 1993 was designed to “establish a program to 
assure nondiscriminatory compliance with all environmental, health and safety laws and to 
assure equal protection of the public health.”  Id.  The 1993 act would have functioned very 
similar to the Environmental Justice Act of 1992, requiring “EPA to publish a list of 
geographic areas with the highest amounts of toxic chemicals.  It would require EPA to 
inspect all toxic chemical facilities operating in Environmentally High Impact Areas (EHIAs) 
and impose a moratorium on the siting of new chemical facilities in EHIAs.”  EPA09: 
Establish a Blueprint for Environmental Justice Throughout EPA’s Operations, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/reports/EPA9 .html (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
 
22
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 
23
 Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
 
24
 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Uma Outka, Comment, Environmental 
Injustice and the Problem of the Law, 57 ME. L. REV. 209, 218 (2005). 
 
25
 Washington, 426 U.S. at 242. 
[A] law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the 
government to pursue, is [not] invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply 
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.  
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Similarly, the Supreme Court applies a strict standard to environmental justice 
claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Section 601 of Title VI 
prohibits discrimination by programs and governmental entities, such as state 
environmental agencies, that receive funding from the federal government.26  
Therefore, citizens can sue state programs and attack policies and decisions on 
discrimination grounds.27  However, as with claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause, individual section 601 claims require proof of intentional government 
discrimination, a standard that often bars recovery.28   
An even more limited avenue for recovery exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
creates a cause of action for any person who is deprived of a federal right guaranteed 
by the laws and Constitution of the United States.29  A § 1983 cause of action only 
                                                          
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of . . . 
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 
Id.; see also Outka, supra note 24, at 218.  The devastating effect this standard had on 
environmental justice cases is illustrated by Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.  
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 673.  In Bean, plaintiffs presented statistical evidence that two-thirds of 
all solid waste dumps in the Houston metropolitan area were placed in predominantly African-
American communities.  Id. at 678.  However, because of the fact that the Texas Department 
of Health, the agency responsible for siting decisions, did not grant permits to all of the dumps 
cited in the statistical data, that evidence did not meet plaintiffs’ burden of proving 
discriminatory intent by the Department.  Id. at 677-78. 
 
26
 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006). 
 
27
 Outka, supra note 24, at 223.  Specifically, Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act 
establishes that no person “on the ground of race, color, or national origin, [shall] be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601. 
 
28
 Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. 463 U.S. 582, 582 (1983) (holding in a 
plurality decision that unless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory and limited injunctive 
relief should be the only available private remedies for Title VI violations); see also Outka, 
supra note 24, at 223.  Additionally, Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act gives funding 
agencies the power to require recipients of federal money to develop regulations to implement 
Section 601.  But the Supreme Court held that Congress does not create a “freestanding 
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602” in the absence of clear 
intent within the statute to create such a right.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 
(2001).  Applying the Court’s holding from Sandoval, the Third Circuit denied recovery for an 
obvious case of environmental injustice in Camden, New Jersey.  S. Camden Citizens in 
Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).  In South Camden, the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection granted a permit for a cement grinding plant 
in a poor minority community whose residents were already burdened with “two Superfund 
sites, several contaminated and abandoned industrial sites, and many currently operating . . . 
chemical companies, waste facilities, food processing companies, automotive shops, and a 
petroleum coke transfer station” and faced the approved development of a sewage treatment 
plant, trash incinerator, and power plant.  Id. at 775.  The district court had granted relief to 
the citizens group on the basis of disparate impact from the multiple polluting facilities in the 
city, but on appeal the Third Circuit reiterated that the statute proscribes only intentional 
discrimination.  Id. at 774. 
 
29
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  Section 1983 provides:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . 
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exists when: the alleged statutory violation is also a violation of a federal right 
intended to benefit the plaintiff; the plaintiff can demonstrate that the protected right 
is not “‘vague and amorphous’”; and that protection of the right is mandatory under 
the federal statute.30  Holding that only Congress can create a federal right by a 
statutory mandate, the Court found that EPA regulations providing freedom from 
disparate impact of environmental decisions are valid but do not create a federal 
right beyond the scope of the statute.31  Therefore, EPA regulations provided for 
freedom from disparate impact of pollution, but the regulations did not create a cause 
of action under § 1983 because the regulations are “‘too far removed from 
Congressional intent to constitute a federal right’” by statutory mandate.32 
3.  Establishing Environmental Justice Agency Policies 
Unlike Congress and the courts, which have continually failed to address 
environmental justice concerns, federal executive agencies have authorized 
numerous policies and strategies to promote environmental justice.  Before engaging 
in any rule making or policy making decision, the executive agencies responded to 
claims of environmental justice by conducting studies in order to either substantiate 
or refute claims of environmental injustice.33  Finding that these studies supported 
environmental justice claims, executive agencies began addressing environmental 
justice concerns.34  The EPA, for example, formed the Environmental Equity 
Workgroup to generate its own study regarding the issues surrounding 
environmental justice.35  The EPA study concluded that environmental injustice 
                                                          
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
Id. 
 
30
 S. Camden, 274 F.3d at 779 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)).  
 
31
 Id. at 790.  
 
32
 Id. (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1009 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 
33
 OUR BACKYARD, supra note 13, at 8.  The GAO report was commissioned by two 
congressmen, one of whom was arrested for participating in the Warren County protests.  Id.  
United Church of Christ, whose members played a major role in organizing the Warren 
County protests, commissioned a study that further supported a finding of environmental 
injustice by the GAO report.  Id. 
 
34
 Many government offices now have environmental justice policies, strategies, or 
guidance documents.  EJ IWG Compendium, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/ environmentaljustice/interagency/iwg-compendium.html (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2010).  In addressing environmental justice issues, a department may establish its 
own strategies, or it may collaborate with other departments and agencies through the Federal 
Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice (EJ IWG).  Id.  Executive Order 12,898 
created the EJ IWG, with the purpose to improve federal environmental justice efforts by 
coordinating policies of fifteen federal agencies and numerous other White House offices. 
Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/ environmentaljustice/interagency/iwg-compendium.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011).  
 
35
 Basic Information: Background, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/environmentaljustice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
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manifested itself primarily through disproportionate siting of polluting facilities and 
hazardous waste facilities in minority communities.36  As a result, the EPA also 
concluded that environmental justice needed to be a priority for the agency.37   
At the same time that Congress was deliberating the Environmental Justice Act, 
the EPA independently started to create procedures for addressing the causes of 
environmental injustice.    Following through on the recommendations of the 
Environmental Equity Workgroup, the EPA created the Office of Environmental 
Justice in 1992.38  In 1993, the EPA declared environmental justice to be a guiding 
principle of its strategic plan to reduce the disproportionately high amount of 
pollution and hazardous waste facilities in minority communities.39  In 1994, 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, which was “designed to focus 
Federal attention on the environmental and human health conditions in minority 
communities and low-income communities with the goal of achieving environmental 
justice.”40  Executive Order 12,898 affirmed the work being done by agencies such 
as the EPA to promote environmental justice despite the frustrations experienced in 
the legislative and judicial branches of government. Executive Order 12,898 requires 
the EPA and its regional offices to consider environmental justice issues in all of its 
permitting decisions.41  Therefore, as a result of Executive Order 12,898, the EPA 
continually updates its strategic plan for environmental justice.  However, neither the 
strategic plan nor the President’s Executive Order creates any binding requirements 
for the agencies to implement or enforce environmental justice policies.  
Furthermore, an evaluation in 2006 by the Office of the General Inspector of the 
EPA confirmed that EPA programs and regional offices failed to conduct 
environmental justice reviews required by Executive Order 12,898 in order to 
                                                          
 
36
 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL 
COMMUNITIES 26 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/ 
resources/reports/annual-project-reports.html. 
 
37
 Id.  
 
38
 Basic Information: Background, supra note 35.  Originally the Office of Environmental 
Equity, created in 1992, the name was changed to its present form in 1994.  Id.  The Office of 
Environmental Justice coordinates and oversees all of EPA’s environmental justice policies, 
as well as managing EPA’s financial resources to ensure that it can achieve the EPA’s 
objectives.  Id.   
 
39
 A strategic plan explains the EPA’s strategic goals to advance its environmental and 
human-health mission.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2011-2015: EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 1 
(2010).  The current strategic plan identifies working towards environmental justice as one of 
the EPA’s “Cross-Cutting Fundamental Strategies” that will change the way in which EPA 
approaches its work.  Id. 
 
40
 Memorandum on Executive Order on Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice 
in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 1 PUB. PAPERS 241 (Feb. 11, 1994).  
The Executive Order provided that each federal agency must develop environmental justice 
strategies in order to provide a framework for analyzing the disparate impact of environmental 
hazards from their programs, policies, and activities.  Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 
7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).  The Executive Order also created the Interagency Working group to 
work on collaborative projects and coordinate efforts by government agencies and other White 
House offices.  Id. 
 
41
 Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice Into EPA 
Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617, 650 (1999). 
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“identify and address disproportionately high and adverse health or environmental 
effects on minority and low-income populations.”42 
Recently, however, the EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, refocused the agency 
on incorporating environmental justice objectives into its projects through two new 
initiatives.  First, the EPA introduced “Plan EJ 2014,” a comprehensive strategy to 
be used as a roadmap for integrating environmental justice into all of EPA’s 
programs.43  The Administrator intends for Plan EJ 2014 to protect overburdened 
communities from further harm and empower those communities to actively improve 
their health and environment by establishing partnerships with government 
organizations.44  Second, the EPA is in the process of revising its guidelines for 
considering environmental justice during the rulemaking process.45  These internal 
guidelines help EPA staff to determine whether a permitting decision raises 
environmental justice concerns and how to address those issues.46  In spite of the 
positive reactions to Plan EJ 2014 and the EPA’s new guidelines, these initiatives are 
reminiscent of earlier “strategies” and “objectives” that do not have the force of law 
and are not binding on agency actions.47  
Therefore, although the federal executive branch has not ignored the issue of 
environmental justice, neither has it provided remedies for victims of environmental 
injustice. Instead of promulgating agency regulations providing environmental 
justice plaintiffs with causes of action under environmental laws, the EPA merely 
requires “consideration” of environmental justice issues.48  Therefore, within the 
framework of the federal government, environmental justice plaintiffs have very 
limited avenues for recovery.  
B.  Environmental Justice at the State Level 
Federal environmental laws do not only give federal agencies regulatory 
authority over environmental issues, but they also delegate certain decision-making 
                                                          
 
42
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT NO. 2006-P-00034, EPA NEEDS TO CONDUCT 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REVIEWS OF ITS PROGRAMS, POLICIES, AND ACTIVITIES 3 (September 
18, 2006), available at www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060918-2006-P-00034.pdf. 
 
43
 Plan EJ 2014, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ 
environmentaljustice/resources/policy/plan-ej-2014.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). 
 
44
 Id.  
 
45
 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INTERIM 
GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 
ACTION i (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/ 
resources/policy/ej-rulemaking.html. 
 
46
 Id. at ii.  
 
47
 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[I]nterpretations contained in 
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all . . . lack the force of 
law.”). 
 
48
 Lazarus & Tai, supra note 41, at 651.  Although Executive Order 12,898 requires the 
EPA and its regional offices to consider environmental justice issues, a guidance document 
from EPA Region V explicitly states that “‘[t]he appropriate response to a finding of 
disproportionate effect will rarely be permit denial; and this should be clearly explained to the 
public.’”  Id. at 652. 
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powers to state administrative agencies.49  The authority to grant permits for new 
polluting facilities is one aspect of environmental regulation that federal 
environmental statutes have delegated to the states.50  However, because there is no 
federal environmental justice statute requiring or setting standards for environmental 
justice concerns, any environmental justice regulations by state agencies must be 
instituted at the discretion of the state legislature.  States have different approaches 
to environmental justice, and some proactive legislatures have developed 
environmental justice strategies.51  
Ohio, like many other states, has assumed permitting authority under several 
different environmental laws.  For example, the state legislature delegated to the 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”) permitting authority under 
the federal Clean Air Act,52 Clean Water Act,53 and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”).54  And, to the extent that any federal statutes implement 
environmental justice policies, the Ohio EPA has the authority to consider those 
issues in the permitting process. For example, the director of Ohio EPA may rescind 
or amend any solid waste facility permits that “create a nuisance” or “create a health 
hazard.”55  However, because federal environmental laws do not require 
consideration of environmental justice issues, the state agencies, like the Ohio EPA, 
that obtain environmental regulatory power are likewise not required to consider 
environmental justice issues.   
Much like the federal EPA, the state administrative agencies have discretion over 
whether to initiate environmental justice regulations.  In spite of their ability to enact 
formal environmental justice policies and regulations, however, most states decline 
the opportunity to do so, limiting their initiatives to strategies that rarely result in 
                                                          
 
49
 State agencies, like other administrative agencies at the federal level, are created by 
statute and obtain delegated power from enabling legislation.  Gregory C. Ward, Lussier v. 
Maryland Racing Commission: Maryland’s Court of Appeals Upholds a Fine Imposed by an 
Administrative Agency Despite a Lack of Specific Authorization to Fine From the General 
Assembly, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 515, 516 (1998). 
 
50
 Panel Tells U.S. EPA to Make Environmental Justice a Larger Concern, 13 BUS. & THE 
ENV’T 15 (2002).  For example, in 2000, state and local environmental agencies issued 99% of 
all air permits, 96% of all wastewater discharge permits, and 98% of all waste permits.  Id.  
The trend of states taking over permitting regulations, therefore, shows that the states have a 
strong interest in regulating environmental issues.  However, the states have traditionally been 
less concerned with promoting civil rights as with protecting the environment.  Yang, supra 
note 6, at 28.  This “schizophrenic” tension in state authority presents another shortcoming of 
the existing approach to environmental justice regulations, which relies exclusively on 
borrowing from environmental and civil rights law.  Id.     
 
51
 Clifford Rechtschaffen, Strategies for Implementing the Environmental Justice Vision, 1 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 321-22 (2007).  
 
52
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3704.03 (West 2010). 
 
53
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.021(A) (West 2010); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
6111.01(L) (West 2010) (defining the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to mean the act as 
amended by the Clean Water Act). 
 
54
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.02(E)(3)(b) (West 2010). 
 
55
 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.02 (West 2010). 
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formal or legally enforceable regulations.56  Therefore, victims of environmental 
injustice are left without a cause of action under both federal and state laws.  
C.  Environmental Justice at the Local Level 
Although municipalities and local governments have more limited power than 
state or federal governments, they often act as laboratories of experimentation for 
new laws and regulations.57  Due to the lack of available remedies and enforcement 
mechanisms for environmental justice at the federal and state levels, environmental 
justice advocates typically have fought for environmental justice regulations through 
nonprofit advocacy organizations.  But one of the most recent examples of 
environmental justice advocacy, the Environmental Justice ordinance58 passed by the 
City of Cincinnati in 2009, diverges from traditional environmental justice advocacy 
and represents an innovation of environmental justice regulations using municipal 
police power to regulate and enforce environmental justice principles.59   
                                                          
 
56
 Rechtschaffen, supra note 51, at 322.  The California legislature, known for being 
progressive and environmentally friendly, has passed environmental justice statutes and an 
environmental justice strategy.  Id.  However, even the California Environmental Protection 
Agency “has yet to adopt any substantive environmental justice regulations.”  Id.   
 
57
 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical 
Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 246 (2000) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  Justice Brandeis noted the important role 
of small governments within the federal system as laboratories for experimentation, 
explaining:  
Some people assert that our present plight is due, in part, to the limitations set by 
courts upon experimentation in the fields of social and economic science; and to the 
discouragement to which proposals for betterment there have been subjected 
otherwise.  There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through 
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and 
economic needs . . . .  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.   
Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 310-11.  
 
58
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
59
 See generally OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (granting a municipal corporation the ability 
to use its police power to protect the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public); 
City of Cincinnati v. Correll, 49 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ohio 1943).  A related issue, but outside the 
scope of this article, is whether the Ordinance, as a municipal ordinance, would be preempted 
by state or federal law.  As a brief introduction to the topic, in Ohio, municipal laws enacted 
under the police power must not “conflict with general laws.”  OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.  
General laws are ones that operate “‘uniformly throughout the state . . . which prescribe a rule 
of conduct upon citizens generally, and which operate with general uniform application 
throughout the state under the same circumstances and conditions.’”  Village of Sheffield v. 
Rowland, 716 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ohio 1999) (quoting Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass’n, 
407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980)).  To determine whether a municipal ordinance conflicts with a 
general law of the state, the courts will ask “‘whether the ordinance permits or licenses that 
which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.’”  Id. (quoting Struthers v. Sokol, 140 
N.E. 519 (Ohio 1923)).  Therefore, an analysis of state preemption of the Ordinance would 
require determining whether state environmental permitting laws are general laws of the state, 
and then whether the Ordinance, which adds additional permitting requirements, is in conflict.  
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The Ordinance, the first of its kind in the nation, has created a new model for 
environmental justice regulation.60  Numerous reports and studies indicated the poor 
air quality and high pollution levels in the Cincinnati area,61 and still more studies 
indicated the adverse health effects of such pollutants on the general public.62  
Therefore, under the authority of the police power to “protect[] the citizenry from 
material, cumulative adverse impacts on health or the environment,” the City 
Council of the City of Cincinnati enacted the Environmental Justice ordinance (“the 
Ordinance”) on June 24, 2009.63   
The City Council based the Ordinance on the basic environmental justice 
principle of providing the fair treatment and meaningful involvement to all people 
under environmental laws,64 and added the goals of eliminating the adverse health 
effects caused by air contaminants and removing the threat of serious or permanent 
harm from local industrial accidents.65  Implementing these goals, the Ordinance 
requires any “proposed project” to obtain an environmental justice permit in order to 
operate within the city.66   A proposed project must submit information regarding the 
type of facility and the activities that will be conducted there, as well as a detailed 
risk analysis of the impact on the community within a one-mile radius of the 
proposed project.67  An appointed city official (the Examiner) must then review the 
                                                          
Federal preemption, on the other hand, can occur either by express preemption or field 
preemption.  City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 634 (1973).  In 
the case of field preemption, the Supreme Court will assume that the States’ historic police 
powers are not superseded by a federal law unless “that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”  Id.  Therefore, to determine whether a conflict between local or federal law exists, 
the court must consider congressional intent.  
 
60
 Crowley, supra note 9.  
 
61
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  The 
City Council’s resolution passing the Ordinance cited the American Lung Association’s 2009 
“State of the Air” Report listing Cincinnati as the eighth worst for particulate pollution and the 
fifteenth worst for ozone pollution among metropolitan areas in the nation.  Cincinnati 
Environmental Justice, CINCINNATI OFF. OF ENVTL. QUALITY http://www.cincinnati-
oh.gov/cmgr/pages/-17684-/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2009). 
 
62
 Cincinnati Environmental Justice, supra note 61.  The Hamilton County Department of 
Environmental Services (HCDOES) collected data showing residents in the Cincinnati area 
faced cancer risks of more than ten in one million.  Id.  The cancer risk in Cincinnati greatly 
exceeds the federal standard of one in one million adopted by multiple federal agencies, 
including the EPA.  Id.  The HCDOES study is supported by the EPA’s National Air Toxics 
Assessment Report, which concluded that the pollution levels in the Cincinnati air yielded 
cancer risks ranging from 30 in one million to 180 in one million.  Id. 
 
63
 Id. at 18. 
 
64
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-3 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
65
 Cincinnati Environmental Justice, supra note 61, at 4-5. 
 
66
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-F (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  A 
proposed project is any activity for which a permit must be obtained from either the Ohio EPA 
or federal EPA under numerous other environmental laws.  CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 1041-5-L (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
67
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-B (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
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information and grant a proposed project an environmental justice permit if it will 
not have a “‘material, cumulative adverse impact’” on human health or the 
environment in the community.68  Therefore, this ordinance provides, for the first 
time, the legal authority for a permit to be denied solely for environmental justice 
reasons.   
Many nonprofit and local organizations in the Cincinnati area supported enacting 
the Ordinance.69  However, the city council faced—and continues to struggle 
against—opposition from local businesses and industry leaders.70  Specifically, the 
Cincinnati Regional Chamber of Commerce objected to the Ordinance because it 
would impede economic development in the city and asserted the City could not 
afford the costs associated with the new administrative procedures.71  Although the 
City Council overcame the objections from the Chamber of Commerce and other 
industrial leaders and passed the Ordinance, implementation of the ordinance had to 
be delayed for lack of funding in the budget.  The new effective date of the 
Ordinance, February 1, 2011, remains contingent upon available funding in the city’s 
budget.72   
Within the context of environmental justice policies at the federal, state, and 
local levels, the Ordinance presents a new and revolutionary system for addressing, 
enforcing, and ensuring the goals of environmental justice by conditioning permits 
solely on environmental justice factors.73  However, as a municipal ordinance, the 
reality of the financial constraints of a city and the strong opposition from political 
and economic leaders may completely bar implementation.  Therefore, a subsequent 
                                                          
 
68
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-7 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  A 
“Proposed Project will have a ‘material, cumulative adverse impact’ on the health or the 
environment of the community” when the operation would cause a public nuisance.  Id.  For 
the purpose of the Cincinnati Ordinance, the Examiner can find a public nuisance if there is a 
reasonable basis to determine that the proposed project will, “1) cause an excess cancer risk; 
2) cause an excess risk of acute health effects; 3) cause an excess risk in the event of an 
accident; or 4) constitute an Air Pollution Nuisance as defined in OAC 3745-15-07.”  Id. 
 
69
 E-mail from Rocky Merz, Pub. Info. Officer, Cincinnati Health Dep’t, to David 
Crowley, Vice Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (May 27, 2009, 11:46 EST) (on file with 
author); E-mail from Fariba Nourian, Citizen of Cincinnati, to Cincinnati City Council (May 
27, 2009, 10:30 EST) (on file with author); Letter from Tony Stieritz, Dir., Catholic Soc. 
Action, to David Crowley, Vice Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (May 26, 2009) (on file with 
author).  
 
70
 Letter from Ellen G. van der Horst, President and CEO, Cincinnati USA Regional 
Chamber, to Mark L. Mallory, Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (June 16, 2009) (on file with 
author).  The Cincinnati USA Regional Chamber so strongly opposed the Ordinance that it 
created an Environmental Justice Taskforce to conduct studies regarding the financial impact 
and the economic burdens the regulations would cause.  Id. 
 
71
 Memorandum from Milton Dohoney, Jr., Cincinnati City Manager, to the Economic 
Development Committee (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with author). 
 
72
 Brian M. Babb, Update on Cincinnati Environmental Justice Ordinance, KEATING 
MUETHING & KLEKAMP PLL (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.kmklaw.com/news-publications-
136.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2010). 
 
73
 Environmental justice considerations include fair treatment under environmental laws 
and freedom from disproportionately high and adverse health of environmental effects.  
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-1 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
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analysis of the effectiveness with which the Ordinance will achieve the goals of 
environmental justice, followed by an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages 
of environmental regulations at different levels of government within the federal 
system, will provide how the provisions of the Ordinance can be most effectively 
and efficiently implemented.  
III.  REGULATING AND ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE STATES 
The main goal of environmental justice is to provide equitable enforcement of 
environmental statutes and to implement procedures to ensure the fair distribution of 
the burdens of pollution among all people.74  However, as the above overview of the 
government’s handling of environmental justice issues shows, the Supreme Court’s 
strict judicial standards, lax administrative agency guidelines, and strategies fail to 
enforce, ensure, and implement procedures necessary to achieving environmental 
justice.  The Ordinance represents a new form of environmental justice policy that 
presents a cause of action and remedy to environmental justice plaintiffs.  
Additionally, the Ordinance provisions address the goals of environmental justice 
and ensure enforcement of environmental justice regulations through a formal and 
legally enforceable regulation.  However, a variety of practical, legal, and policy 
issues prevent the Ordinance from providing an efficient means for implementing 
environmental justice regulations.  Nonetheless, if adopted at the state level by 
administrative agencies, the Ordinance serves as an effective model for future 
environmental justice regulations.  
A.  The Cincinnati Ordinance as Model for Environmental Justice Regulations 
A true environmental justice policy must address the goals of the environmental 
justice movement—to equitably enforce environmental statutes and implement 
procedures to ensure environmental justice results.75  Numerous commentators, 
advocates, and critics have analyzed and written about the necessary components of 
an effective environmental justice policy,76 but a comprehensive study conducted by 
the National Academy of Public Administration (“the Academy”) identified that the 
primary reason government agencies fail to achieve environmental justice is because 
                                                          
 
74
 Mank, supra note 15, at 425 n.1. 
 
75
 See Environmental Justice, supra note 3 (the goals of the environmental justice 
movement are based on the EPA’s definition of environmental justice).  The proposed 
Environmental Justice Acts in the early 1990s provide an example of an environmental justice 
policy that some commentators believe would have failed to achieve the movement’s goals.  
Hasler, supra note 17, at 445.  Specifically, critics claimed that both statutes failed to provide 
equitable protection from environmental injustice, did not ensure the immediate response of 
government enforcement, and did not include provisions for meaningful redress.  Id.  Whereas 
the Ordinance provides immediate redress by using a nuisance standard, the Environmental 
Justice Acts would not have taken effect until at least three years after enactment, in order to 
give the EPA and the Department of Health and Human Services time to conduct research and 
collect data.  Id. at 453.  The proposed acts also would not have achieved equality because 
they only provided protection for the one hundred counties with the highest total weight of 
toxic chemicals.  Id. at 447.  Finally, although the proposed acts would have implemented 
moratoria on building new polluting facilities, they did not create a cause of action to provide 
recourse for other environmental justice situations.  Id. at 458.  
 
76
 See generally Hasler, supra note 17; Yang, supra note 6; Rechtschaffen, supra note 51; 
Mank, supra note 15. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
238 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:223 
 
their policies do not include measures that keep the agencies accountable for their 
actions.77   
By isolating government accountability as the most important aspect of an 
environmental justice policy, the Academy concluded that government or agency 
regulations will not be effective unless they incorporate gathering data, providing 
opportunities for meaningful public participation, and other administrative 
procedures to ensure equitable enforcement into their provisions.78  Each of these 
three additional components will enable a government agency to internally track its 
progress towards achieving environmental justice.  Furthermore, these factors will 
also increase government transparency, and the public will be able to hold the 
governmental entity or agency accountable for any shortcomings towards achieving 
its environmental justice goals.79  The Ordinance, unlike other government policies, 
addresses each of these factors and stands as an effective model for future 
environmental justice regulations.  
1.  Gathering Data 
Gathering data regarding local pollution rates and their impact on human health 
and making such information publically available increases an agency’s 
accountability by providing it with the information to assess the accuracy and 
effectiveness of its environmental justice policies.80  The Ordinance requires the 
collection of data in several ways.  First, each permit application must include a list 
of substances to be emitted or stored by the facility and an accident risk analysis.81  
Also, the Examiner may consider various sources of data relating to pollution 
burdens, disease rates, increases in emissions, cancer risks, and the general health, 
safety, and welfare of the community in which the proposed project is going to be 
located.82  All the information collected must be made available to the public for 
review,83 thereby providing the city with data to assess the effectiveness of its 
policies.  Furthermore, the Ordinance requires the city to publish bi-annual city-wide 
                                                          
 
77
 NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING: REDUCING 
POLLUTION IN HIGH-RISK COMMUNITIES IS INTEGRAL TO THE AGENCY’S MISSION (2001) 
(hereinafter “ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING”); NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., 
MODELS FOR CHANGE: EFFORTS BY FOUR STATES TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 11 
(2002) (hereinafter “MODELS FOR CHANGE”); see also Ann E. Goode & Suellen Keiner, 
Managing for Results to Enhance Government Accountability and Achieve Environmental 
Justice, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 289, 308 (2004). 
 
78
 Goode & Keiner, supra note 77, at 294.  
 
79
 Id.  
 
80
 Id. at 302-03.  
 
81
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-A (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  
But note that this does not require disclosures of the amounts of substances to be stored, or 
projected amounts of emissions, which would provide more detailed data with which to 
calculate the impact that a proposed project would have on the surrounding community.  
 
82
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-9 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
83
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
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pollution reports84 that will ensure the city does, in fact, assess the effectiveness of 
its policies.   
2.  Providing Meaningful Public Participation 
Complete and prompt public notification of permitting actions facilitates 
accountability by building a relationship of trust with the public and empowering the 
public to identify environmental justice issues.85  However, the Academy concluded 
that only providing legal notices or making information available at a government 
office fails to yield meaningful public participation.86  Rather, “culturally competent 
outreach, including language translation and explanation of scientific and technical 
issues, meetings . . . [and] longer comment periods,” has greater success of 
generating meaningful public participation.87   
The Ordinance provides measures for prompt public notification of permitting 
activities, but it should be modified to provide more complete notification.  The 
Ordinance requires the Office of Environmental Quality to send written notice within 
ten days of the application being completed and requires the City to make the 
application information available to the general public within ten days following the 
written notice being sent.88  Although the Ordinance provides prompt written 
notification,89 the public would have more complete access to the information if the 
Ordinance included opportunities for open discussion in public meetings, or 
provided assistance interpreting the data.  Adding those measures to the existing 
public notice provision in the Ordinance would increase public participation and 
increase the City’s accountability to a well-informed public.90   
3.  Ensuring Equitable Enforcement 
Relying on methods similar to data collection and public participation, the 
Academy found that agencies and governments can improve and ensure equitable 
enforcement by taking advantage of the local community’s knowledge of the 
facilities and concerns, implementing enforcement actions that include monetary 
                                                          
 
84
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-21 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  In 
making the application information available to the public, the Ordinance applies some of the 
Academy’s recommendations for improving public access to pollution information.  
Specifically, the Academy recommends using the Internet and other low-cost or no-cost media 
outlets to disseminate information regarding permitting actions.  Goode & Keiner, supra note 
77, at 304.  The Cincinnati Ordinance incorporates this suggestion by requiring public notice 
through the City’s website “of all projects that are subject to the provisions of [the 
Ordinance].”  CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 
2011).  
 
85
 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN EPA PERMITTING, supra note 77, at 73.  
 
86
 Id.  
 
87
 Id.  
 
88
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
89
 Id.  
 
90
 The Ordinance allows the Office of Environmental Quality to develop additional 
administrative policies and procedures not already contained within the Ordinance.  
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-25 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).   
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penalties, and evaluating the results of such enforcement measures.91  The Academy 
recommends using proactive methods of community outreach, similar to those 
recommended for facilitating meaningful public participation, to access community 
knowledge and build a relationship with the affected community.92  The Ordinance 
provides both civil and criminal enforcement procedures with monetary penalties,93 
but its public participation and data collection provisions do not require community 
outreach and therefore restricts access to community knowledge that would help the 
Examiner make permitting decisions.  However, by revising the public notice 
provisions of the Ordinance to include procedures for community outreach, rather 
than merely notification, it will better ensure equitable enforcement of its provisions.   
B.  Centralization-Decentralization Debate Applied to Environmental Justice 
Regulations 94 
Considering the minimal alterations and improvements suggested above, the 
Ordinance provides effective and mandatory environmental regulations to ensure the 
enforcement of environmental justice policies.  However, an analysis of the 
Ordinance and its development within the centralization-decentralization debate of 
environmental regulations shows that the Ordinance will be more effective if 
incorporated into state administrative agency regulations, rather than as a municipal 
ordinance.   
1.  The Centralization-Decentralization Debate 
Within the field of environmental law, federal statutes and federal agency 
regulations govern the majority of environmental regulations.95  Although the 
                                                          
 
91
 Goode & Keiner, supra note 77, at 307; MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 77, at 11.   
 
92
 MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 77, at 12.  
 
93
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-27 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  A 
civil compliance order will be issued on the basis of any information that indicates a person 
violated the Ordinance.  Id.  The order may include revocation of a permit, and may include a 
fine not in excess of $15,000.  Id.  Similarly, if the violator does not comply with the terms of 
the order, the Director of the Office of Environmental Quality may revoke the permit and 
issue a fine not in excess of $15,000 for each day of noncompliance.  Id.  Additionally, any 
knowing violation, omission, or material misrepresentation is a misdemeanor in the first 
degree and subject to a fine.  Id.   
 
94
 See generally Weiland, supra note 57.  “The . . . centralization/decentralization debate 
influences the many doctrines that compose intergovernmental relations in the United States,” 
such as preemption and just environmental law.  Id. at 249.  The debate has also been applied 
to land use regulations under a theory entitled the “quiet revolution.”  See generally Sara C. 
Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the 
States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231 (2008).  The quiet revolution argues, “[the] states should take 
back their police power to regulate extralocal issues in a manner that maintained . . . the 
existing land use system and the respect for local autonomy.”  Id. at 231-32.  Environmental 
justice is closely related to both fields of environmental law and land use regulation.  Based on 
those similarities and the factor of intergovernmental relations implicit in any regulatory 
scheme within a federalist system of government, this Note applies the centralization-
decentralization debate to the discussion of the Ordinance and the environmental justice 
movement. 
 
95
 ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 259 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).  
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environmental justice movement is closely related to the environmental regulations 
and policies, it does not follow that environmental justice policies should likewise be 
centralized through a national statute and federal agency control.  During the 
development of environmental regulations in the 1970s, lawmakers and politicians 
analogized social and political movements as wars—such as the war on poverty—to 
describe the widespread need for reform in areas such as poverty and the 
environment.96  Therefore, widespread concern for the environment during this time 
motivated the federal lawmakers to use the full scope of their regulatory authority to 
reverse the trend of environmental degradation.97  
Aside from the historical and political rationales for national environmental 
regulations, national control of environmental regulations was and still is justified by 
two main practical considerations.  First, the federal government caused many of the 
large-scale and panic-inducing environmental problems—such as nuclear power 
plants, dams, and overgrazing of federal lands—through federal programs.98  As 
such, it is within the federal government’s scope of authority and its responsibility to 
change environmental policies.99  Second, federal environmental regulations are 
justified because environmental problems are inherently interstate—pollution will 
inevitably cross state lines into and out of numerous jurisdictions.100  However, the 
actions that cause pollution and environmental problems originate on a local level 
and vary depending on local conditions.101  Therefore, there is also an argument to be 
made that environmental problems are inherently local, and can be more efficiently 
regulated at the local level of government.102   
Developing environmental justice regulations involves similar considerations of 
nationally centralized or locally decentralized regulations.  Just like environmental 
issues, environmental justice issues vary widely depending on the local natural, 
social, political, cultural, economic conditions.  Requiring such specific problems to 
be handled by through a cumbersome federal bureaucratic chain of command would 
limit the government’s ability to respond quickly in order to protect residents from 
environmental hazards and preserve their quality of life.103  Furthermore, the federal 
                                                          
 
96
 Id. at 260.  The greater political context of the 1970s, including great unrest over the 
Vietnam War, encouraged lawmakers to analogize social movements to wars and to use the 
full scope of federal power to fix domestic problems.  Id.  By analogizing domestic 
environmental problems to military conflicts, lawmakers could introduce sweeping national 
policies and “boast that they had won the fight before it began.”  Id.   
 
97
 Id.  
 
98
 Id.  
 
99
 Id.  
 
100
 Id.  A popular mantra in the 1970s described the interstate nature of the environment 
and pollution as, “‘[e]verything is connected to everything else.’”  Id. 
 
101
 Id. at 263.  
 
102
 Id. at 259.  
 
103
 Id. at 263.  The complex bureaucratic chain of command refers not only to people and 
agencies involved, but also the hierarchy of different written regulations.  Id.  For example, 
resolving any single environmental issue requires looking at the EPA regulations, any agency 
guidance documents that interpret the relevant regulation, and then any additionally applicable 
state plans, policies, strategies, or regulations.  Id. 
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“command and control regulatory strategy”104 imposes controls on localities in spite 
of local wishes, squanders resources, and cannot adequately account for wide 
disparities in local conditions.105  However, state or local governments have a more 
limited jurisdiction, and would be able to “assess particular problems as they arise 
and decide what should be done, just as sensible human beings handle issues that 
arise in their lives.”106  Nonetheless, extreme local control of environmental justice 
issues at the municipal level has its shortcomings too, which relate primarily to the 
inefficiencies that would arise from having a wide variety of environmental justice 
policies within a very small geographic area.  Each argument in favor of centralized 
environmental regulations represents a disadvantage of decentralized regulations, 
and vice versa.  But, as the following comparison of arguments for both centralized 
and decentralized environmental regulations shows, the advantages of both can be 
amplified while the disadvantages can be mitigated by implementing regulations at 
the state level.   
2.  Centralization 
Centralizing environmental regulations at the national level has numerous 
advantages. The primary arguments in favor of centralizing environmental 
regulations in the federal government are that it: (1) overcomes problems associated 
with negative externalities; (2) results in a predictable and uniform regulatory 
environment; (3) provides consideration for varied interests through the political 
process; (4) overcomes lack of capacity experienced at lower levels of governments, 
and (5) it furthers environmental regulations as a national moral imperative.107  
First, centralizing environmental justice regulations minimizes negative 
externalities suffered by a local government when pollution crosses into and out of 
neighboring jurisdictions.108  Negative externalities occur when one agent’s actions 
impose costs on others, such as when pollution from one city travels to another.109  
As a municipal ordinance, the Ordinance ensures that proposed projects within 
Cincinnati will not contribute to disproportionately high pollution levels within its 
boundaries, but it cannot control the negative externalities caused by pollution or 
permitting decisions in neighboring cities.  These negative externalities undermine 
the purpose of the Ordinance “to provide Environmental Justice to all citizens of 
Cincinnati.”110  Implementing the Ordinance at a higher level of government will 
internalize the problem of negative externalities by enforcing environmental justice 
regulations across municipal jurisdictional boundaries.   
Secondly, centralized environmental justice regulations will also provide the 
benefits of a uniform regulatory environment.111  Uniform regulations help achieve 
                                                          
 
104
 Id.  
 
105
 Id.  
 
106
 Id.  
 
107
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 238-44.   
 
108
 Id. at 239.  
 
109
 Id.  
 
110
 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-3 (2002) (effective July 24, 2009). 
 
111
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 241-42.  
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environmental justice by establishing a baseline for fair treatment and meaningful 
participation in local permitting decisions while allowing industries to operate within 
a predictable regulatory structure.112  Uniformity and predictability results in lower 
costs for businesses, an issue that is especially relevant in low-income environmental 
justice communities.  In Cincinnati, industries in the Chamber expressed concern 
that the costs of complying with the Ordinance would deter economic development 
within the City.113  Any amount of regulation will increase business costs and burden 
taxpayers, and the administrative procedures in the Ordinance and regulatory are no 
exception.114  However, imposing the same permitting requirements on businesses 
throughout the state or country will prevent an individual city from losing businesses 
to neighboring municipalities because of stricter permit requirements and allow a 
greater number of taxpayers to share the financial burden.   
Thirdly, although centralized regulations result in uniform regulations, those 
uniform regulations represent a greater variation of interests through the political 
process.115  Whereas powerful interests can influence and even dominate local 
politics, the influence of special interests is diluted at the state and federal levels of 
government.116  At a higher level of government, small environmental justice 
                                                          
 
112
 Id. at 242-43.  
 
113
 Letter from Ellen G. van der Horst, supra note 70.  Specifically, one Cincinnati 
chemical corporation noted that “the Ordinance would impede our ability to react to changes 
in the global specialty chemicals market.”  Letter from Gregory E. Pflum, Vice President and 
CAO, Cognis Corp., to David Crowley, Vice Mayor of the City of Cincinnati (May 13, 2009) 
(on file with author). 
 
114
 Memorandum from Milton Dohoney, Jr., supra note 71.  The City Council agreed that 
the Ordinance would have an impact on economic development in the City, but minimized the 
magnitude of its effects and argued that the increased reputation for sustainability and 
livability would attract new businesses and residents.  Id. 
 
115
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 241. 
 
116
 Id.  The ability for special interests to dominate local politics can be further illustrated 
by a number of “syndrome behaviors.”  OUR BACKYARD, supra note 13, at 107.  Syndrome 
behaviors represent common categories of actions “taken when citizens are affected, or think 
they are going to be affected, by environmental hazards and actions by politicians who are 
forced to respond to citizens’ concerns.”  Id.  Syndrome behaviors are particularly relevant in 
environmental justice, because people rely on others—politicians, legislators, and government 
officials—to offer protection from environmental hazards.  Id. at 110.  Several of the most 
common syndrome behaviors are: Not In My Backyard (NIMBY); Not In My Term Of Office 
(NIMTOO); Not In My Election Year (NIMEY); Put It In Their Backyard (PIITBY); and 
Why In My Back Yard (WIMBY).  Id. at 111-12.  Each syndrome behavior results in response 
to different situations.  For example, NIMBY occurs in politically proactive communities, 
usually those that are economically affluent, whose residents fight strongly against polluting 
facilities in their communities.  Id. at 112.  NIMTOO tends to occur in politically active 
communities when a politician avoids the opposing desires of businesses and residents by 
delaying passing laws, or refusing to pass laws, while in office.  Id. at 114.  NIMEY, on the 
other hand, has little do with the political activity of the community, but more with timing in 
relation to re-election.  Id. at  117.  With election or re-election on the horizon, many decisions 
are heavily politicized and “motivated by the [politician’s] desire to survive and advance 
politically.”  Id.  The PIITBY syndrome response is the most likely to lead to environmental 
injustice in low-income and minority communities.  Id. at 118.  When politically active and 
affluent communities make strong NIMBY arguments, politically weak communities are often 
the chosen location for hazardous or polluting facilities.  Id.  Finally, a WIMBY syndrome 
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advocates and grassroots organizations can join together and have a greater chance 
of defeating powerful political and economic interests.  Although the Cincinnati City 
Council was able to overcome opposition from industries, the Ordinance barely 
survived the four-year long process.       
Fourthly, centralized environmental justice regulations will also solve the 
problem of a city’s lack of capacity to fund the environmental justice regulations.117  
Estimated to cost $125,000, the Chamber argued that the City could not afford to 
implement the regulations in light of a projected budget deficit.118  The Chamber’s 
prediction came true, and the City Council had to formally postpone implementing 
the Ordinance due to a lack of funding in the City’s budget.119  Arguably, increasing 
the scope of environmental justice regulations at the state or federal level would 
increase administrative costs. However, it would also increase the tax base and avoid 
the Chamber’s primary concern of deterring business growth because of its stricter 
permit requirements.   
Finally, centralized environmental justice regulations will strengthen the 
movement by establishing it as a national moral imperative.120  Environmental issues 
used to be perceived as problems that only worried affluent citizens, but there is 
widespread support for environmental issues.121  In Cincinnati, numerous community 
organizations and concerned citizens expressed widespread support for the 
Ordinance.122  As with the environmental and civil rights movements, centralized 
regulations provided plaintiffs with legal remedies—something still lacking for the 
environmental justice movement.  By providing legal remedies and strengthening 
environmental justice as a national moral imperative, centralized regulations will 
help achieve the goals of environmental justice—to ensure equitable enforcement of 
environmental laws for all people.  
                                                          
response is most common in the low-income and minority communities, which tend to be 
“more reactive than proactive in their responses to decisions concerning environmental 
hazards.”  Id. at 119.  With the success of environmental justice policies so closely tied to 
political syndrome responses, it is necessary to dilute the effects of those political whims by 
centralizing environmental justice regulations.   
 
117
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 240.  
 
118
 Letter from Ellen G. van der Horst, supra note 70.  The Chamber President further 
noted: 
At a time when the City of Cincinnati faces a projected $40 million budget deficit, 
creating a new unfunded mandate detrimental to business growth could only have a 
negative impact.  Without significant business growth, the City’s tax revenues will 
likely decrease and it will become more difficult to reduce the City’s projected deficit. 
Id. 
 
119
 Babb, supra note 72.  The current effective date, February 1, 2011, remains conditional 
upon adequate funding within the City budget.  Id.   
 
120
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 243. 
 
121
 Id. at 244.  The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Reagan 
Administration’s failure to dismantle it, is evidence of generally widespread concern for 
environmental issues.  Id.   
 
122
 See, supra note 69. 
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3.  Decentralization 
Alternatively, proponents of decentralization argue that local governments are 
best suited to control environmental law and policy because: 1) environmental 
problems are place-specific, 2) it encourages responsiveness between government 
and its citizens, 3) it encourages experimentation and development of innovative 
policies, 4) it allows for flexibility in handling complex problems, and 5) it 
encourages inter-jurisdictional competition.123  
The main argument in favor of decentralized environmental regulations is that 
environmental concerns are place-specific, varying based on the climate and 
topography of the area.124  Beyond physical geographic characteristics, 
environmental justice issues can also vary depending on the cultural, economic, and 
historical characteristics of the region,125 such that uniform centralized regulations 
are ineffective.126  The Ordinance addresses these place-specific issues by providing 
opportunities for local public participation, where concerned and informed residents 
can establish the context for the problem.127  Furthermore, the Ordinance requires the 
proposed project’s permit application to include risk-analysis data for the 
surrounding area within a one-mile radius, allowing the Examiner to fully consider 
the impact of the proposed project given the very specific environmental, social, and 
economic factors of a given neighborhood or community.128  The Ordinance 
incorporates another tier of place-specific regulations by requiring bi-annual research 
studies of air quality within the City of Cincinnati.129  By basing permitting decisions 
on individual public concerns, community-level, and city-wide data, the Ordinance 
allows for its provisions to be adapted to a wide variety of environmental justice 
issues based on location.  Therefore, if expanded to a state-wide regulation, the 
                                                          
 
123
 Id. at 244-48. 
 
124
 Id. 
 
125
 For instance, Cincinnati’s environmental justice problems have to do mostly with air 
pollution from industrial manufacturing. CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041 
(2010) (effective Feb 1, 2011).  The environmental justice issues in South Camden, New 
Jersey, concerned issues of air pollution as well.  S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).  The Warren County protests and Love Canal 
tragedy illustrate another form of environmental justice issue, dealing primarily with 
hazardous waste issues.  OUR BACKYARD, supra note 13, at 6; Beck, supra note 4.  Finally, the 
history of colonization and land being taken away from indigenous people provides the basis 
for environmental justice organizations in the American Southwest.  NOVOTNY, supra note 2, 
at 28-31.  These examples do not exhaust the different variations of environmental justice 
issues.  A national environmental justice policy would have to address all of those issues 
equally, or else fail to adequately achieve environmental justice throughout the country.  Such 
a regulation, however, would almost certainly be overwhelmingly complex to the point of 
being ineffective.  
 
126
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 244-45.  
 
127
 CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
128
 See CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-5-B (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011) 
(defining “community” to mean the area surrounding the Proposed Project encompassing a 
one-mile radius). 
 
129
 CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-21 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
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Ordinance would still incorporate its adaptability to specific situations by basing all 
permitting decisions on the data collected during the application process and other 
administrative procedures.130  
Secondly, decentralized regulations will encourage government responsiveness 
to problems of environmental justice.  Encouraging responsiveness between a local 
government and its citizens is based on the idea that it encourages the spirit of liberty 
by bringing the government within the people’s reach.131  Environmental justice is an 
issue that impacts people’s everyday quality of life, and cannot be achieved unless 
government provides a forum for communication.  The Ordinance includes public 
participation provisions that provide administrative procedures to facilitate 
communication and responsiveness between government and its citizens.132  Public 
meetings and notification procedures similar to those in the Ordinance are common 
at the local level, but could also be conducted by a state agency.  Therefore, even if 
extrapolated and expanded to a state agency, the Ordinance will retain the benefit of 
making a government responsive to its people.     
Thirdly, decentralization allows local governments to develop and adopt 
innovative policies.133  The Ordinance is a new and innovative policy that developed 
within a municipal “laboratory” of experimentation.134  By working on a smaller 
scale and within a local government, the passion and dedication of a few people can 
create an entirely new policy and reform an entire area of law.135  The Ordinance 
began as the special project of the vice-mayor of Cincinnati, and his hard work 
created an entirely new kind of ordinance.136  Therefore, providing an innovative 
solution to the problem of environmental justice, the logical next step for the 
Ordinance is to integrate it into either state or national agency regulations.    
Fourthly, decentralized regulations allow for flexibility.137  The idea of flexibility 
within a local government is contrasted with the stereotypical rigidity of bureaucratic 
institutions that result from cumbersome chains of command and fixed standard 
operating procedures.138  Environmental justice issues, however, are very complex 
                                                          
 
130
 CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-15 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011).  As a 
state-wide ordinance, the permitting decisions would still be based on the risk-analysis data 
provided in the application, and it would retain a provision for municipalities to periodically 
update their own data through comprehensive studies.  Of course, adapting the Ordinance to 
the state level would require creating additional administrative positions to collect data, but 
those decisions could be made by the agency, and would not alter the provisions of the 
Ordinance.   
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 Weiland, supra note 57, at 246.  
 
132
 CINCINNATI OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-13 (2002) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
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 Weiland, supra note 57, at 245.  
 
134
 Id. at 246.  
 
135
 Crowley, supra note 9.  The Ordinance was the first of its kind in the country, and exists 
almost exclusively because of the passion and perseverance of Vice Mayor Crowley.  Id.  He 
fought for the passage of the Ordinance for four years against strong opposition from the 
Cincinnati business community.  Id.   
 
136
 Id.  
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 Weiland, supra note 57, at 245.  
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and incorporate a wide range of variations that require flexibility, but the Ordinance 
contains specific provisions that require regulatory flexibility, rather than simply 
relying on the flexible character of local government.  For instance, the Ordinance 
allows for flexibility by requiring continual collection of data from each permit 
application and review of each application.139  Additionally, instead of setting 
uniform minimum or maximum standards, the Ordinance applies a nuisance standard 
to review permitting decisions.140  Therefore, because the Ordinance contains 
specific provisions that require regulatory flexibility, the Ordinance could be adopted 
and centralized at a state agency without compromising the benefit of decentralized 
regulations their ability to handle complex environmental justice issues. 
The last argument in favor of a local decentralized environmental justice policy 
is that it will encourage interjurisdictional competition.141  The phenomenon of 
interjurisdictional competition is predicated on the theory that individuals can vote 
for government services either through their words or actions.142  Thus, different 
communities or jurisdictions would adopt different regulations based on the desires 
of the people.  Although this option could also result in a given jurisdiction having 
no environmental justice regulations, the case of the Ordinance shows that in a small 
enough jurisdiction, one person or a small group of people can influence the course 
of local regulations.  Furthermore, interjurisdictional competition combined with the 
ability of local governments to innovate new regulations would allow the Ordinance, 
as a model, to be changed and improved to suit each jurisdiction and its needs.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The current regime of environmental justice policies and remedies are 
insufficient to achieve the goals of the environmental justice movement.  Throughout 
the 1990s, the federal government resisted incorporating environmental justice 
policies into the federal statutes and the common law of the courts.  The executive 
branch and its administrative agencies proved more willing to address environmental 
justice concerns, but executive orders and agency strategies are only enforced at the 
discretion of the agency and place no binding requirements on the agencies.   
Therefore, the primary shortcoming of current environmental justice policies at the 
federal, state, and local levels is that there is no statutory mandate that requires 
agencies or municipalities to implement and enforce environmental justice goals.  
Similarly, agency strategies that lack the force of law leave plaintiffs to pursue 
environmental justice claims under environmental or civil rights laws, whose strict 
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 CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1041-15 (2010) (effective Feb. 1, 2011). 
 
140
 Id.  A nuisance determination is based on the review of facts specific to each case, 
rather than a pre-set and rigid standard operating procedure and the examiner will only issue a 
permit if he determines that “a Proposed Project will pose a material, cumulative, adverse 
impact on the health of the environment of a community.”  Id.   
 
141
 Weiland, supra note 57, at 247.  
 
142
 Id.  A “public choice” model of interjurisdictional competition shows that citizens can 
use their voices to customize the mix of services provided by the government, and can leave a 
jurisdiction in order to move to a community that has services to suit individual preferences.  
Id. at 247.  Although the public choice model yields socially desirable results, it will also give 
rise to jurisdictions that care little about environmental protection.  Id.  It follows that in such 
jurisdictions, environmental justice issues would be most severe, yet the local government 
would be the lease responsive. 
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standards typically bar recovery.  To actually achieve environmental justice, the 
states must adopt regulations that establish mandatory requirements for 
administrative agencies to follow, and that provide legal remedies for environmental 
justice plaintiffs. 
The Ordinance from Cincinnati presents a new model for environmental justice 
regulations because it provides a formal legal remedy for environmental justice 
claims. Furthermore, analyzing the Ordinance within the centralization-
decentralization debate shows that the regulation will be most effectively 
implemented at the state level.  Implementing the Ordinance at the state level is ideal 
because it is neither completely centralized nor decentralized, and can therefore 
maximize the benefits of each.  By passing statutes like the Ordinance, state 
legislatures can achieve environmental justice by empowering their administrative 
agencies to regulate the fair treatment of all people under environmental laws.  
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